Evaluating the Constitutionality of Proposals to Allow Non-Unanimous Juries to Impose the Death Penalty in Georgia by Caucci, Lisa
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 3 Spring 2010 Article 5
March 2012
Evaluating the Constitutionality of Proposals to
Allow Non-Unanimous Juries to Impose the Death
Penalty in Georgia
Lisa Caucci
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lisa Caucci, Evaluating the Constitutionality of Proposals to Allow Non-Unanimous Juries to Impose the Death Penalty in Georgia, 26 Ga.
St. U. L. Rev. (2012).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/5
EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
PROPOSALS TO ALLOW NON-UNANIMOUS




With recent attempts by the Georgia General Assembly to pass
legislation allowing non-unanimous juries to impose the death
penalty, Georgia may once again figure prominently in the debate
over American capital punishment standards.' Legislation removing
the unanimity requirement for capital punishment would trigger a
constitutional challenge and inevitable Supreme Court review. 2 This
Note examines the proposed legislation in light of controlling
Supreme Court opinions to predict the Court's ruling on the
constitutionality of allowing death sentences to be imposed by non-
unanimous juries. Part I traces the development of Georgia's current
death penalty laws.3 Part II describes recent attempts to amend
Georgia's death penalty provisions to allow non-unanimous juries to
sentence defendants to death.4 Part III discusses arguments for
shifting away from the traditional emphasis on unanimity in jury
decisions.5 Part IV examines Supreme Court decisions regarding the
unanimity requirement in criminal cases.6 Part V looks at the
constitutionality of allowing judges to make final determinations of
sentencing, including imposing the death penalty.7 Part VI examines
the Supreme Court's limits on the authority of judges to increase
. J.D. 2010, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. See discussion infra Parts 1, II.
2. Sara E. Deskins & Nancy E. Rhinehart, Review of Selected 2007 Georgia Legislation: Criminal
Procedure, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 61, 75 (2007) (citing E-mail Interview with Anne Emanuel, Professor
of Law, Ga. State Univ. Coll. of Law (May 9, 2007)).
3. See discussion infra Part I.
4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. See discussion infra Part LII.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. See discussion infra Part V.
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defendants' sentences. 8  Finally, Part VII concludes that an
amendment to Georgia law permitting judges to impose the death
penalty despite a non-unanimous jury sentencing decision will likely
survive a Supreme Court challenge.
9
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GEORGIA'S CURRENT DEATH PENALTY LAW
The state of Georgia has played a controversial role in the history
of American capital punishment jurisprudence. 10 The Supreme
Court's 1972 ruling in a Georgia death penalty case, Furman v.
Georgia,"I that the Eighth Amendment required the protection of
capital defendants from "arbitrary and capricious" death penalty
sentencing, led to a four-year moratorium on executions in
America. 12  Thirty-five states subsequently amended their death
penalty statutes to remedy the problems found by the Supreme Court
in Furman.'3 In 1976, while reviewing a later Georgia case, Gregg v.
Georgia,14 the Supreme Court affirmed a death sentence pursuant to a
post-Furman statute. 15
8. See discussion infra Part VI.
9. See discussion infra Part VII.
10. In 1988, Georgia became the first state in the nation to pass legislation banning the execution of
the mentally impaired. See Georgia to Bar Executions of Retarded Killers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1988,
at A26. But more recently the American Bar Association issued the findings of the Georgia Death
Penalty Assessment Team urging a moratorium on executions in the state of Georgia until the state
addressed multiple "problem areas." See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND
ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE GEORGIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT
iii-v (2006) (citing as the areas most needing reform: inadequate defense counsel at trial; lack of defense
counsel for state habeas corpus proceedings; inadequate proportionality review; inadequate pattern jury
instructions on mitigation; racial disparities in Georgia capital sentencing; inappropriate burden of proof
for mentally retarded defendants facing the death penalty; and allowing the death penalty for felony
murder).
11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12. Laurie B. Berberich, Note, Jury Instructions Regarding Deadlock in Capital Sentencing, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1301, 1303 (2001).
13. Id. at 1304.
14. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Along with Gregg, the court considered four other cases:
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
15. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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DEATH PENALTY IN GEORGIA
A. Furman v. Georgia
In its 1972 review of Furman,16 the Supreme Court for all practical
purposes found every capital punishment statute in the United States
unconstitutional.' 7 The Court split 5-4, with each of the Justices in
the majority writing a separate concurrence.' 8 Although there is no
controlling opinion from the case, the Justices in the majority
emphasized that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and
unusual punishment" demanded proportionality in sentencing and
prohibited the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty allowed by
state statutes.'
9
B. Gregg v. Georgia
Following Furman, state legislatures struggled to enact new death
penalty schemes that would comport with the Court's holding that
states must protect capital defendants from the arbitrary imposition of
the death penalty. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court held that
Georgia's new death penalty statute adequately addressed the
constitutional deficiencies cited in Furman.2 1 Georgia's new death
penalty scheme included a bifurcated system, which separated the
guilt phase from the sentencing portions of the trial.22 Georgia also
mandated that the jury find proof of at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance for a murder defendant to be eligible for the death
23penalty. Finally, Georgia statute provided for automatic review of
all death sentences by the Georgia Supreme Court.24
16. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
17. James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 107
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (2007).
18. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240, 257, 306, 310, 314.
19. Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1195, 1200 (2000).
20. Berberich, supra note 12, at 1304.
21. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207.
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C. Current Georgia Death Penalty Procedure
Current Georgia law requires a jury to unanimously find the
existence of at least one aggravating circumstance for a defendant to
be eligible for the death penalty.25 Once a jury finds the existence of
an aggravating circumstance, it must then agree unanimously to
impose the death penalty on the defendant.26 If the jury is unable to
come to a unanimous decision to impose a death sentence, the judge
must then sentence the defendant to either life in prison or life
without parole.
27
II. PROPOSED CHANGES TO GEORGIA'S DEATH PENALTY PROCEDURE
Each of the two most recent sessions of the Georgia General
Assembly saw the introduction of legislation that would have allowed
non-unanimous juries to impose the death penalty on a defendant
convicted of a capital crime.28 The proposals ultimately failed, but
given the strong sentiments of their supporters, 2 9 similar proposals
are likely to be introduced in upcoming sessions.
A. House Bill 185
In January 2007, House Majority Whip Barry Fleming introduced
House Bill 185 .30 The bill proposed allowing judges to impose a
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (2008). ("Where, upon a trial by jury, a person is convicted of an
offense which may be punishable by death, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury
verdict includes a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and a recommendation that
such sentence be imposed."). For a complete list of statutory aggravating circumstances, see id § 17-10-
30(a). But see David McCord, An Open Letter to Governor George Ryan Concerning How to Fix the
Death Penalty System, 32 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 451, 453 (2001) (arguing that "[a]ggravating factors in
every jurisdiction are over-inclusive," making defendants guilty of less egregious crimes eligible for the
death penalty, thus undermining the equality in sentencing mandated by Furman).
26. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31(c) (2009) ("If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to
sentence, the judge shall dismiss the jury and shall impose a sentence of either life imprisonment or
imprisonment for life without parole.").
27. Id.
28. Ben Smith & Bill Rankin, 10, Not 12, Jurors Would Decide Death Under Bill, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Mar. 20, 2008, at ID.
29. See discussion infra Part Il.A.
30. Carlos Campos, Bill: 9 Jurors to Give Death, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 30, 2007, at IA; H.B.
185, 149th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007).
[Vol 26:31006
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DEATH PENALTY IN GEORGIA
death sentence on defendants when jurors could not reach a
unanimous sentencing verdict.31 Fleming acknowledged that the
failure of juries to give death sentences to convicted killers Wesley
Harris32 and William Kenny Stephens 33 influenced his support of the
proposal. In fact, members of the Harris jury campaigned for the
modification of the unanimity requirement. 34 Outraged over their
inability to persuade two holdout jurors to vote for the death penalty,
the former jurors spent two years lobbying lawmakers for changes to
Georgia's death penalty statute.
3 5
House Bill 185 would have allowed a convicted murderer to be
sentenced to death if nine of twelve jurors voted to impose the
sentence.3 6 The House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee amended the
bill to change the required number of juror votes to eleven37 in an
effort to withstand a constitutional challenge.3 8  Representative
Fleming, the bill's sponsor, failed in his attempt to amend the bill to
require only ten jurors to vote for the death penalty.39
After heated debate, House Bill 185 passed the Georgia House in
March 2007.40 Some House members worried about the political
ramifications of giving judges the discretion to sentence a defendant
to death, including the possibility that judges facing re-election might
31. Id.
32. Lateef Mungin, Gwinnett Murders Created Activists, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 11, 2007, at 1A.
In 1999, Wesley Harris abducted twenty-two-year-old Whitney Land and her two-year-old daughter
Jordan from a park in Clayton County and took them at gunpoint to another metro county. Harris shot
the young mother in the back, pulled her from the car and shot her twice more in the chest. Harris then
shot the child as she sat strapped in her car seat. Harris used Land's cell phone to call a friend to help
him bum the car with the victims' bodies still inside. Id.
33. Id. After appeals overturned the death sentences he received in his first two trials, Stephens is
serving a life sentence for murdering Larry D. Stevens, a Richmond County, Georgia, Sheriffs
Investigator, on January 24, 1979. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Although the jury convicted Harris for murdering Whitney Land and her daughter Jordan, the
jury deadlocked ten to two during death penalty deliberations. As a result, Harris received a life sentence
without parole. Id.
36. Deskins & Rhinehart, supra note 2, at 66.
37. Id.
38. Representative Kevin Levitas warned his fellow representatives against passing legislation "that
we do not believe will pass constitutional muster." Id. at 68 (citing Video Recording of House
Proceedings, Mar. 20, 2007 at 3 hr., 37 min., 09 sec. (remarks by Rep. Kevin Levitas (D-82nd))).
39. Id. at 66.
40. Id. at 70.
20101
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succumb to pressure to impose death sentences to avoid looking soft
on crime. 41 Supporters of the bill argued that there was a need to
restore the public's faith in the judicial system after several cases in
which "hold-out" jurors had prevented the defendant from receiving
the death penalty.42 When the bill came before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, however, Fleming did not appear to present the bill.43
Unable to consider the bill without Fleming's presentation, the
committee instead took a swift vote, and the bill failed
unanimously.
44
B. Senate Bill 145
A second attempt to pass legislation that would have allowed a
non-unanimous jury to impose the death penalty in Georgia failed in
March 2008. 45 Senate Judiciary Chairman Preston Smith introduced
Senate Bill 145, a bill that would have allowed district attorneys to
seek sentences of life without parole in aggravated murder cases.46 In
the Georgia House, Majority Whip Barry Fleming amended the
proposal to allow non-unanimous juries to sentence convicted
murderers to death.47 Accusing members of the House of "playing
politics," the Senate defeated the amended statute 44-7.48
41. Id. (citing Video Recording of House Proceedings, Mar. 20, 2007 at 3 hr., 50 min., 15 sec.
(remarks by Rep. Randal Manghan (D-94th))) ("[W]hen you make the judge the ultimate decider,
someone in that race for that superior court judgeship will look at the record and come back and say
look at this soft judge who refused to impose the death penalty after ten people or eleven people say he
should die."); see Campos, supra note 30, at IA ("There are political considerations that are going to
come into play that don't come into play when you have a largely anonymous jury ... and no one
person is the lightning rod for the decision." (quoting attorney Stephen Bright)); see also Scott E. Erlich,
Comment, The Jury Override: A Blend of Politics and Death, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1403, 1444 (1996)
(discussing former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird, who lost a recall election after
opponents attacked her record of overturning death sentences).
42. Deskins & Rhinehart, supra note 2, at 67-68; see Mungin, supra note 32, at IA (citing critics of
the current Georgia death system who suggest that some jurors misrepresent their opposition to the death
penalty in order to serve on capital juries and deliberately thwart the imposition of a death sentence).
43. Campos, supra note 30, at 4B.
44. Id.
45. Bill Rankin, Legislature 2008, Senate Delivers Its Verdict; Plan Rejected: Proposal Would Have
Allowed Non-Unanimous Jury Decisions in Capital Cases, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 21, 2008, at 5E.
46. Smith & Rankin, supra note 28; S.B. 145, 149th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2008).
47. Rankin, supra note 45.
48. Id. Fleming proposed the bill while seeking the Republican nomination for the 10th
Congressional District of Georgia. Id.
[Vol. 26:31008
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DEATH PENALTY IN GEORGIA
III. THE MOVEMENT AWAY FROM UNANIMITY REQUIREMENTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
As in other states that have considered measures to relax unanimity
requirements, 49 the Georgia proposals arose in the aftermath of a
high-profile case in which a minority of jurors prevented the
imposition of a death sentence on the defendant.50 Indeed, attempts to
change Georgia's sentencing statute to allow a death sentence
without a unanimous jury decision are part of a larger movement to
shift the American jury system away from unanimity.51 Proposals to
remove the unanimity requirement from criminal trial verdicts5 2 are a
result, in part, of the widespread public perception that juries are
increasingly unable to reach verdicts in criminal trials, and that as a
result, guilty defendants are walking free.53 When juries deadlock in
controversial cases, critics of the jury system seize upon the public's
outrage "to urge radical correction of the current system," including
dispensing with the unanimity requirement in death penalty
sentencing procedures.
5 4
49. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1261, 1265-66
(2000) (noting the verdict in the O.J. Simpson case as an example of a high-profile verdict that resulted
in calls for a reform of the jury system); see also James Kachmar, Comment, Silencing the Minority:
Permitting Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 28 PAC. L.J. 273, 293 (1996) (discussing the
Simpson case and the efforts of Fred Goldman, the father of one of Simpson's alleged victims, to amend
the California Constitution to allow juries in non-death penalty criminal cases to render a guilty verdict
with only a five-sixths' majority). See also Robin Lutz, Comment, Experimenting with Death: An
Examination of Colorado's Use of the Three-Judge Panel in Capital Sentencing, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
227, 247-48 (2002) (discussing the life sentence given by a panel of judges to convicted murderer Donta
Page, which led to an unsuccessful proposal to reform Colorado's sentencing procedure to allow ten of
twelve jurors to agree on a recommendation of a death sentence).
50. See discussion supra Part B.A.
51. See generally Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, And So Say Some of Us... What to
Do When Jurors Disagree, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 429 (2000).
52. The National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (NCADP) refers to these proposals as
"reaction bills." Leigh Dingerson, Reclaiming the Gavel: Making Sense out of the Death Penalty Debate
in State Legislatures, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 873, 877-78 (1991).
53. Kachmar, supra note 49, at 293.
54. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 49, at 1265-66.
20101 1009
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A. Arguments for Retaining the Unanimity Requirement in Criminal
Verdicts
Supporters of retaining the unanimity standard argue that the
quality of jury deliberations will suffer if non-unanimous verdicts are
permitted in criminal trials.55 In other words, requiring consensus
forces jurors to deliberate over the evidence and encourages
engagement with the viewpoints of other jurors.56 However, a jury
that is not required to come to a consensus, but only to reach a
majority decision, will have no incentive to prolong deliberations
once that majority has been reached. 57 When a jury reaches the
number of votes necessary for a verdict, the majority of jurors are
free to simply ignore the views of jurors who disagree. 58 As Jeffrey
Abramson writes:
If they are instructed to return a unanimous verdict, jurors know
their task is not to vote. For all their differences, they must
approach justice through conversation and the art of persuading
or being persuaded in turn. Majority verdicts signal an entirely
different type of behavior, where jurors ultimately remain free to
assert their different interests and opinions against one another.
The distinctive genius of the jury system has been to emphasize
deliberation more than voting and representation. Abolishing the
unanimous verdict would weaken the conversations through
which laypersons educate one another about their common sense
of justice.59
Proponents of unanimity also point out that dispensing with the
unanimity requirement could lead to a loss of confidence in the
judicial system among minority communities. If primarily white
55. Kachmar, supra note 49, at 305.
56. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 49, at 1274.
57. Kachmar, supra note 49, at 305.
58. Id. at 305.
59. Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 51, at 454 (citing JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE
JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 205 (1994)).
60. Kachmar, supra note 49, at 303-04.
1010 [Vol. 26:3
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DEATH PENALTY IN GEORGIA
juries are routinely able to come to majority verdicts without having
to try to build a consensus of all the jurors, those jurors who are
members of racial or ethnic minorities may sense that their views are
being marginalized.i Subsequently, members of minority
communities may become reluctant to participate in the judicial
process if they believe that "their voices are being silenced in the jury
room."
62
B. Arguments for Dispensing with the Unanimity Requirement in
Criminal Verdicts
Proponents of dispensing with the unanimity requirement argue
that the emphasis on unanimity is merely a relic of English custom
and an "historical accident." 63 Several other countries with legal
systems based on the British system have already relaxed the
unanimity requirement. 64 Critics argue that Americans err by placing
faith in unanimous jury verdicts because the emphasis on unanimity
"encourages jurors to vote insincerely" for the sake of creating "an
illusion of consensus." 65 In fact, they argue, allowing juries to reach
decisions on the basis of majority or supermajority is much more
closely tied to American "political and constitutional culture" 66 than
the requirement of juror unanimity.
Moreover, proponents of relaxing the unanimity requirement deny
that allowing majority verdicts will diminish the quality of jury
deliberations, pointing out that unanimous juries may be faced with
the problem of the "eccentric holdout" who refuses to take part in
67jury deliberations. Champions of majority verdicts insist that their
61. Id. at 303.
62. Id.
63. Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 51, at 444 (citing SIR P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 48 (1988)).
64. Id. at 445-47. England requires only ten of twelve jurors to agree on a verdict, Australian states
have adopted standards of ranging from nine to twelve, and Ireland and Northern Ireland need only ten
votes out ofjuries of either eleven or twelve. Id.
65. Id. at 430.
66. Ethan J. Leib, Supermajoritarianism and the American Criminal Jury, 33 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 141, 147 (2006). "Why the obsession with unanimity here-and why is that the baseline decision
rule when almost no other decision in public political life gets made by unanimous consent?" Id. at 142.
67. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169,
1191 (1995).
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scheme can still "preserve the ideal of jury deliberation and self-
education," and that judges will play an important role in advising
juries to focus on evidence and to delay voting until each juror has
had an opportunity to voice his or her opinion. 68 Proponents also
suggest that rather than disenfranchising minorities, allowing non-
unanimous verdicts will empower those in the minority to voice their
dissent rather than submit to pressure to accept a majority verdict
with which they disagree.
69
The Supreme Court has upheld moves away from unanimity in
supermajority statutes passed in Oregon and Louisiana.70  But the
Oregon and Louisiana statutes concerned criminal verdicts in non-
capital cases. 71  That each of these states made an exception for
capital cases points to recognition that the death penalty is
"different." 72 With public support for the death penalty on the wane,
is there justification for extending a relaxation of the unanimity
requirement to the sentencing phase and making it easier to sentence
a defendant to death?
73
68. Id. However, the author's suggestion that under a majority verdict scheme, "jurors should talk to
and listen to each other seriously and with respect," is both short on specifics and indistinguishable from
expectations ofjurors under the current unanimous verdict system. Id.
69. Id. at 195-96.
70. Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 51, at 447; see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
71. Leib, supra note 66, at 141.
72. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986). But see Daniel P. Collins, Making Juries Better
Fact/lnders, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489, 497-98 (1997):
Because, in my view, the Constitution compels a unanimous jury of [twelve] citizens, I
would not advocate.., the use of non-unanimous juries. [Hiowever... I do not advocate
a unanimity requirement for capital sentencing juries. [Unanimous capital juries] fail to
take account of the important differences between the function of a jury at trial and its
function at sentencing.... [A] criminal trial jury is intended to be an accurate determiner
of factual guilt, but a capital sentencing jury is essentially making a normative, moral
judgment. Given the diversity of views that exist on the subject of capital punishment, I
think in many cases insistence on a unanimous verdict is more than we should reasonably
expect.
73. Deskins & Rhinehart, supra note 2, at 63 (citing DEATH PENALTY INFo. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE
DEATH PENALTY (2007), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documentsFactSheet.pdf).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT PERMITS NoN-UNANIMouS JURY VERDICTS
IN CRIMINAL CASES
The proposed amendment to Georgia's death penalty statute would
allow a death sentence to be imposed without a unanimous jury
sentencing decision.74  This shift away from the unanimity
requirement is the most striking change in the Georgia proposal. Yet
the Supreme Court held in Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v.
Louisiana that the Constitution does not require unanimous jury
verdicts in the guilt phase of criminal cases.75 However, neither the
Oregon nor the Louisiana statute at issue in those cases permitted
non-unanimous jury verdicts in capital cases. 76
A. Apodaca v. Oregon
In 1972, the Supreme Court held in Apodaca that a state criminal
conviction by a non-unanimous jury did not violate the constitutional
right to trial by jury.77 The petitioners in Apodaca were convicted in
separate trials under Oregon law, which permitted non-capital
criminal convictions by "less-than-unanimous" juries.78
The petitioners noted the Court's earlier holding in Duncan v.
Louisiana that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial requirement applied
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and argued that a requirement of unanimous jury
verdicts should also extend to the states. 79 However, the Court
concluded that because the Sixth Amendment did not require
74. See discussion supra Part II.
75. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
76. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
77. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 404 (1972). Robert Apodaca was convicted of assault with a
deadly weapon and convicted by an 11-1 jury vote. Henry Morgan Cooper, Jr. was convicted of
burglary in a dwelling by a 10-2 jury vote. James Arnold Madden was convicted of grand larceny by an
1 I-1 vote. Id. at 405-06.
78. Id. at 406 n.l (citing OR. CONST. art I, § 11 (1934)) ("[T]en members of the jury may render a
verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be
found only by a unanimous verdict....").
79. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411-12; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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unanimity, a unanimity requirement "was not of constitutional
stature" and thus did not implicate the Due Process Clause.
80
The Court also dismissed the petitioner's argument that unanimity
was required for "effective application" of the requirement that juries
reflect a cross-section of the community.8 ' The petitioners argued that
allowing non-unanimous jury verdicts could effectively silence
minority communities in the jury room.8 2 But the Court held that the
Constitution did not require that "every distinct voice in the
community" had a right to be heard in every jury deliberation. 83 The
Constitution only forbids "systematic exclusion" of minority
populations from the jury pool. 84 The Court dismissed the idea that
minority viewpoints would not be adequately represented "simply
because they may be outvoted in the final result."
85
The Court also refused to accept the argument that non-unanimous
jury verdicts would lead to higher conviction rates of minority
defendants. 86 However, as one commentator has pointed out, the
Court failed to provide any legal rationale for this position, relying
instead "on sweeping assumptions about the psychology of jury
decision-making."
8 7
B. Johnson v. Louisiana
The Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Louisiana, a case decided
the same day as Apodaca, that Louisiana could allow non-unanimous
80. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406.
81. Id. at412.
82. Id. at 412-13.
83. Id at 413.
84. Id ("No group, in short, has the right to block convictions; it has only the right to participate in
the overall legal processes by which criminal guilt and innocence are determined.").
85. Id. But see Taylor-Thompson, supra note 49, at 1269 ("The Court cited no precedent or jury
research to reach this conclusion. It simply rejected the petitioners' assumption in favor of its own....
[T]he Court made an interesting leap: it equated presence with influence.").
86. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 413-14 ("We simply find no proof for the notion that a majority will
disregard its instructions and cast its votes for guilt or innocence based on prejudice rather than the
evidence.").
87. Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the Protection of the Holdout
Juror, 40 U. MIct. J. L. REFORM 569, 576 (2007).
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88juries to convict defendants in non-capital criminal cases. Louisiana
law permitted criminal defendants to be convicted through various
means-by a judge, by a unanimous jury of five, or by nine members
of a jury of twelve--depending on the nature of the crime and the
severity of the punishment.
89
The Court rejected Johnson's argument that the Due Process
Clause required a unanimous jury decision in order to meet the
reasonable doubt standard.90 Instead, the Court reasoned that because
nine of the jurors had voted for a conviction, Louisiana had met its
standard of reasonable doubt.91 The Court also rejected the argument
that Louisiana violated the Equal Protection Clause by requiring
different numbers of votes for convictions depending on the severity
of the crime and possible punishment, holding that the State had the
discretion to raise its burden of proof in accordance with the crime.
92
As in Apodaca, the majority in Johnson again dismissed the
contention that permitting non-unanimous convictions would allow
the majority of jurors to dismiss the doubts of the minority.93
However, Justice Stewart in his dissent argued that "community
confidence" in the criminal justice system would decline if "a
defendant who is conspicuously identified with a particular group can
be acquitted or convicted by a jury split along group lines." 94
88. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 356. Frank Johnson was convicted of armed robbery by a nine-to-three jury
verdict. Id. at 358.
89. Id. at 357-58 n.l (citing LA. CONST. art VII, § 41 (1921)) ("All cases in which the punishment
may not be hard labor shall, unless otherwise provided by law, be tried by the judge without a jury.
Cases, in which the punishment may be hard labor, shall be tried by a jury of five, all of whom must
concur to render a verdict; cases, in which the punishment is necessarily at hard labor, by a jury of
twelve, nine of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases in which the punishment may be capital, by
a jury of twelve, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.").
90. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 359.
91. Id. at 362 ("That rational men disagree is not in itself equivalent to a failure of proof by the State,
nor does it indicate infidelity to the reasonable-doubt standard.").
92. Id. at 364 ("We perceive nothing unconstitutional or invidiously discriminatory, however, in a
State's insisting that its burden of proof be carried with more jurors where more serious crimes or more
severe punishments are at issue.").
93. Id. at 361 ("We have no grounds for believing that majority jurors, aware of their responsibility
and power over the liberty of the defendant, would simply refuse to listen to arguments presented to
them in favor of acquittal, terminate discussion, and render a verdict.").
94. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Under today's judgment, nine jurors can simply ignore the
views of their fellow panel members of a different race or class.").
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Although the Court's rulings in Apodaca and Johnson permitted
states to allow non-unanimous verdicts in criminal trials, only two
states have chosen to do so.95 Furthermore, federal criminal trials
continue to require unanimous verdicts.96 The Apodaca and Johnson
rulings have been criticized because of the potential harm that
allowing majority verdicts may have on the quality of jury
deliberations. 97 Juries that are only required to reach a majority
opinion may fail to fully "explore all possible arguments for the
defendant's innocence." 98 In addition, such juries may fail to give
jurors in the minority opinion "a chance to convince the majority that
the defendant is guilty only of a lesser included offense," increasing
the possibility of a "verdict born of prejudice or bigotry" if the jury is
"split along race or class lines."99
V. THE SUPREME COURT PERMITS JUDGES ALONE TO IMPOSE
DEATH SENTENCES
In the recent bills to change Georgia's death penalty proceedings, a
criminal defendant could be sentenced to death by either a unanimous
jury decision, or by the trial judge alone if the required majority of a
jury voted for a death sentence. 100 This jury override mechanism,
though marking a significant change for the state of Georgia,
comports with Supreme Court holdings that jury participation is not
required in capital sentencing.' 01
A. Spaziano v. Florida
In 1984, the Supreme Court in Spaziano v. Florida upheld a
Florida law permitting a judge to impose a death sentence after the
95. Michael H. Glasser, Comment, Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in
Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 671 (1997).
96. Id. at 670.




100. See discussion supra Part I.
101. Lutz, supra note 49, at 228-29.
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jury had recommended life imprisonment. !° 2 Florida law gave the
jury only an advisory role in sentencing. 103 Once the jury found that
aggravating circumstances existed, the trial judge in Spaziano was
authorized to conduct an independent sentencing assessment-
"weighing . .. the aggravating and mitigating circumstances" to
determine whether to sentence the defendant to life in prison or
death. '04
Spaziano argued that allowing a judge to override a jury sentencing
recommendation violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishments."' 0 5 But the Court said that
its Furman holding that state death penalty statutes must guard
against arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing was not intended
to suggest "that the sentence must or should be imposed by a jury."'10 6
The Court also rejected Spaziano's argument that allowing the judge
to make the sentencing decision violated the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of a right to jury trial, holding that "[t]he Sixth Amendment
never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination of
that issue."' 10
7
Spaziano also argued that Florida's statute violated the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause by allowing the State two
chances at imposing a death penalty, first in the jury sentencing phase
and again during the judge's deliberation of sentence.' 0 8 The Court
102. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 449 (1984) ("We... reject petitioner's argument that.., the
Florida standards for overriding a jury's sentencing recommendation are so broad and vague as to
violate the constitutional requirement of reliability in capital sentencing."). Joseph Robert Spaziano was
convicted of first-degree murder. Id. at 450.
103. Id. at 451. "Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or
death, but if the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which
the sentence of death is based as to the facts ..." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1983).
104. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 451.
105. Id. at457-58.
106. "[T]here certainly is nothing in the safeguards necessitated by the Court's recognition of the
qualitative difference of the death penalty that requires that the sentence be imposed by a jury." Id. at
460. "If a State has determined that death should be an available penalty for certain crimes, then it must
administer that penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom
death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not." Id. (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
873-80 (1983)). "It must allow the sentencer to consider the individual circumstances of the defendant,
his background, and his crime." Id. (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978)).
107. Id. at459.
108. Id. at 458.
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held that because the jury sentencing verdict was only advisory, the
Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply. 1
09
Finally, Spaziano argued that the unique nature of the death
penalty as "an expression of community outrage" necessitated that
the sentence be imposed by the jury as "the voice of the
community."' 110 The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the
community's voice may be expressed through other means,
specifically through legislation that permits death sentences, defines
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and sets standards for
capital sentencing."'
The Court made note in its decision of "the significant safeguard
the Tedder standard affords a capital defendant in Florida." 112 Under
Tedder, the "jury recommendation" for sentencing "should be given
great weight" and "the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be
so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ."' 1 3 However, one commentator points out that by praising
Tedder the Court undercut its own ruling. 1 4 Though Spaziano held
that a judge alone could impose a sentence, the "Court's ostensible
support of Florida's Tedder safeguard is the Court's unspoken
allegiance to the very principle it purported to reject-capital
sentencing is, in truth, the jury's job."'' 15
B. Harris v. Alabama
In its 1995 decision in Harris v. Alabama, the Supreme Court
considered a statute similar to the Florida law at issue in Spaziano.16
109. Id. at 458-59 ("[T]he Court has concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the State from
making repeated efforts to persuade a sentencer to impose the death penalty .... [But] [t]here is no
similar danger involved in denying a defendant a jury trial on the sentencing issue of life or death.").
110. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 461.
111. Id. at 462-63 ("The point is simply that the purpose of the death penalty is not frustrated by, or
inconsistent with, a scheme in which the imposition of the penalty in individual cases is determined by a
judge.").
112. Id. at 465.
113. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
114. Amy D. Ronner, When Judges Impose the Death Penalty After the Jury Recommends Life: Harris
v. Alabama As the Excision of the Tympanic Membrane in an Augmentedly Death-Biased Procedure, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 248 (1995).
115. Id.
116. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
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The Alabama statute entitled a capital defendant to a jury sentencing
hearing at which aggravating and mitigating factors were
presented. 117 The jury weighed those factors and then offered an
advisory verdict to the judge." 8 Although the jury was allowed to
recommend death only if a minimum of ten jurors voted for it, the
trial judge was permitted to do his own analysis of the aggravating
and mitigating factors before final sentencing was determined. 119 In
Harris's case, the jury recommended a sentence of life without
parole, but the trial judge found the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and imposed the death
penalty.
120
Harris contended that the jury sentencing verdicts must be "more
than advisory" and that the jury should have "the key sentencing role,
subject only to review by the judge." 121 Harris noted that Florida
judges were required to give "great weight" to the jury's sentencing
recommendation, while the Alabama statute set no standard for the
weight the trial judge was to give to the jury's advisory verdict.
12 2
Harris further contended that because Alabama judges did not always
provide specific reasons for imposing a sentence different from the
jury's recommendation, judges in different trials might be giving
different weights to the jury sentencing verdicts. 123
117. 1d. at 506 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1994)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Louise Harris solicited her lover, Lorenzo McCarter, to hire someone to kill her husband, a
deputy sheriff. The Supreme Court noted that Harris was a mother of seven who held three jobs,
participated in her church, and whose "strong character" was attested to by many witnesses at her
sentencing hearing. However, McCarter testified that Harris was motivated by receiving her husband's
death benefits of $250,000. The sentencing judge found that the single statutory mitigating factor,
Harris's lack of prior convictions, was outweighed by the one statutory aggravating circumstance, the
commission of murder for pecuniary gain. Id. at 507-08.
121. Id. at 512.
122. Harris, 513 U.S. at 509 (citing Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)) ("[T]rial judges
must give 'great weight' to the jury's recommendation and may not override the advisory verdict unless
'the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable
person could differ."').
123. Id. at 514.
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The Court rejected Harris's argument, noting that it had already
held that judges alone could impose death sentences. 124 The Court
further held that Alabama's "standardless jury override scheme" did
not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and
unusual" punishment. 125 The Tedder "great weight" standard that
Florida judges were to accord to jury sentencing advisories was not
"constitutionally required."' 126 The Court declined to impose "a
specific degree of weight" for judges to place on a jury advisory
verdict, reasoning that it would be acting as a legislator if it created
such a standard for Alabama judges. 127
The Harris ruling was criticized as a movement away from the
Court's post-Furman jurisprudence. 128 Critics complain that by
permitting Alabama's standardless jury override, the Supreme Court
essentially backed away from the notion of protecting capital
defendants from arbitrary and capricious imposition of death
sentences. 129 As one commentator argued, "Harris endorsed the view
that one person should have the unbridled power to impose death
over the collective judgment of twelve."130
VI. THE SUPREME COURT LIMITS A JUDGE'S AUTHORITY TO
INCREASE CRIMINAL SENTENCES
The proposed amendments to Georgia's capital sentencing
procedure would permit a judge to impose a death sentence upon a
defendant even if the jury is unable to come to a unanimous
124. Id. at 515 ("The Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence. It
is thus not offended when a State further requires the sentencing judge to consider a jury's
recommendation and trusts the judge to give it proper weight.").
125. Erlich, supra note 41, at 1430.
126. Harris, 513 U.S. at 511 ("We thus made clear that, our praise for Tedder notwithstanding, the
hallmark of the analysis is not the particular weight a State chooses to place upon the jury's advice, but
whether the scheme adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results.").
127. Erlich, supra note 41, at 1430-31.
128. Id. at 1430.
129. Id. at 1431.
130. Id. at 1431 ("This arrangement is problematic for two reasons. First, it tends to dilute the
community's voice as represented by the collegial body-the jury. Second, it gives judges the
unchecked power to impose death.").
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determination that death is the appropriate punishment.'3 1 While the
U.S. Supreme Court does not require a jury to participate in capital
sentencing, the Court has held that a jury must make any
determination of facts that could lead to a capital sentence.
132
In Ring v. Arizona in 2002, the Supreme Court declared invalid an
Arizona statute permitting the trial judge to make the sole
determination of aggravating circumstances in a capital case.' 33 Ring
was convicted of felony murder during an armed robbery, but under
Arizona law, he could not receive a death sentence without additional
findings of aggravated circumstances.' 34 Arizona law provided for a
separate non-jury hearing to allow the judge to determine the
existence of aggravated circumstances.' 35 Following that hearing, the
judge found the existence of aggravating circumstances and
sentenced Ring to death. 1
36
Ring challenged his death sentence on the grounds that allowing
the judge to be the sole trier of facts that increased his maximum
penalty violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.'37 The Court
rejected the State's argument that allowing judges to determine
aggravating circumstances might be a "better ... guarantee against
the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty," reasoning that "[t]he
Sixth Amendment jury trial right . . does not turn on the relative
rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders."1 38 Two
years earlier, the Court had held in Apprendi v. New Jersey that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that any
fact with the potential for increasing the sentence for a criminal
defendant must be submitted to the jury and meet the reasonable
131. See discussion supra Part H1.
132. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
133. Id. at 589 ("Capital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants, we conclude, are entitled to
a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum
punishment.").
134. Id. at 593 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (2001)).
135. Id. at 592-93 (citing ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (2001)).
136. Id. at 594-95. The judge found two aggravating circumstances: that Ring committed the crime
for pecuniary gain and in "an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." The judge found Ring's
minimal criminal record a non-statutory mitigating factor that did not call for leniency. Id.
137. Id. at 595.
138. Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 32).
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doubt standard. 139 In Ring, the Court applied the Apprendi ruling to
capital defendants, holding that if elements that could extend a
defendant's sentence must be put before a jury, "the Sixth
Amendment would be senselessly diminished" unless a jury was also
required to do "the factfinding necessary to put him to death.' 140 A
commentator agreeing with the Ring decision put it in the following
terms: "[w]hy should a capital defendant actually enjoy less
protection under the Constitution than an ordinary criminal
defendant?"'
141
VII. How WOULD THE SUPREME COURT RULE ON GEORGIA'S
PROPOSED CHANGES TO DEATH PENALTY PROCEEDINGS?
The proposed change to Georgia's death penalty statute would
allow a judge to impose a death sentence on a defendant even if the
jury does not unanimously agree that the death penalty should be
imposed. 142 This proposal comports with Supreme Court rulings that
jury unanimity is not a constitutional requirement and that judges
alone may impose a death penalty.1
43
The real question, then, is whether the Supreme Court is willing to
extend its holding that jury unanimity is not a constitutional
requirement in the criminal phase of a trial to the sentencing portion
of a capital case. That question may ultimately turn not on precedent,
but on an increasing awareness of the role that race plays in the
criminal justice system.
139. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
140. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; see also id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("1 believe that the fundamental
meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the
level of punishment that the defendant receives-whether the statute calls them elements of the offense,
sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.").
141. John M. Challis, I'm Sorry Your Honor, You Will Not Decide My Fate Today: The Role of
Judges in the Imposition of the Death Penalty: A Note on Ring v. Arizona, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
521,556(2003).
142. See discussion supra Part ll.A-B.
143. See discussion supra Part IV.
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A. Georgia Proposals Comport with Supreme Court Precedent
The proposed changes to Georgia's death penalty sentencing
procedures would eliminate the jury unanimity requirement in
sentencing. 144 Given that the Supreme Court held over thirty-five
years ago in Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana that jury
decisions in the guilt phase of a trial did not need to be unanimous,
the Georgia proposal would seem to comport with the Court's current
position. 145 However, it is telling that neither the Oregon nor
Louisiana statutes at issue in those Court holdings permitted non-
unanimous jury verdicts in capital cases. 14 6 Therefore, it remains
unclear whether the court would be willing to extend the Apodaca
and Johnson holdings to the guilt phase of a capital case.
But the guilt phase is not at issue in the proposed Georgia reforms.
Rather, only the sentencing phase of a capital trial would be
affected. 147 The Court held in both Spaziano v. Florida and Harris v.
Alabama that the Constitution does not require jury participation in
the sentencing portion of a capital case.' 48 A judge alone may impose
a capital sentence on a defendant.
149
The Supreme Court has limited the role of the judge in increasing
the maximum sentence a defendant faces.' 50 In Ring v. Arizona, the
Court held that a jury must make the determination of any facts that
could increase a defendant's sentence, including the existence of
aggravating circumstances that could trigger a defendant's eligibility
for the death penalty. 151 The proposed changes in Georgia incorporate
this rule. 152 Any aggravating circumstances would still have to be
found by the jury. 153 Under the proposed guidelines, if the jury found
one or more aggravating circumstances and if the required majority
144. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
145. See discussion supra Part IV.
146. See discussion supra Part IV.
147. See discussion supra Part ll.A-B.
148. See discussion supra Part V.
149. See discussion supra Part V.
150. See discussion supra Part VI.
151. See discussion supra Part VL
152. See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
153. See discussion supra Part ll.A-B.
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of jurors voted in favor of a death sentence, the judge could then
impose such a sentence.
154
B. Schriro v. Summerlin
In 2004, the Supreme Court ruled in Schriro v. Summerlin that its
Ring holding was procedural and did not announce a watershed rule
of criminal procedure. 155 Therefore, the Ring holding that juries
rather than judges must find aggravating circumstances necessary to
impose the death penalty did not apply to cases already final on direct
review. 156
In the Schriro dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the Eighth
Amendment required juries to make capital sentencing decisions.1 57
Breyer's dissent called jury sentencing in capital cases "a
fundamental aspect of constitutional liberty" and also claimed juries
were "more likely to produce an accurate assessment of whether
death is the appropriate punishment."' 58 The dissent further argued
that capital cases "can[not] tolerate" the same "risk of error" as non-
capital cases, citing Justice Burger's concurrence in Ake v. Oklahoma
that "[i]n capital cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants
protection that may or may not be required in other cases.'
' 59
C. Snyder v. Louisiana
Significantly, Schriro was decided by only a 5-4 majority. 16' Two
of the Justices in the majority, William Rehnquist and Sandra Day
154. See discussion supra Part l.A-B.
155. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
156. Id. But see Kenneth C. Haas, The Emerging Death Penalty Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court,
PIERCE L. REV. 387, 397 (2008) (noting that some legal scholars argue that requiring juries to make the
determination of aggravating circumstances necessary for the death penalty will nevertheless lead to the
imposition of fewer death sentences).
157. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I believe the Eighth Amendment demands the
use of a jury in capital sentencing because a death sentence must reflect a community-based judgment
that the sentence constitutes proper retribution.").
158. Id.
159. Id. at 362-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Burger,
J., dissenting)).
160. Id. at 348.
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O'Connor, are no longer on the Court. 16 ' In 2005, John Roberts
replaced Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 162 Several
months later, Samuel Alito replaced Justice O'Connor. 163 This
change in composition of the Supreme Court, however, does not
necessarily portend any deviation from the Rehnquist Court rulings in
death penalty cases. As one commentator has noted, the Roberts
Court has already weakened procedural safeguards for capital
defendants. 164 However, an examination of a 2008 Roberts Court
ruling indicates that predicting Supreme Court decisions on capital
matters may be more complicated than anticipated. 1
65
In 2008, the Court in a 7-2 decision reversed a murder conviction
in Snyder v. Louisiana after finding that the prosecutor may have
engaged in racial discrimination in striking a prospective black juror
from the jury pool. 166 After challenges for cause, a panel of eighty-
five prospective jurors was reduced to thirty-six potential jurors, only
five of whom were black.167 All five were removed from the pool
through prosecutorial peremptory strikes. 168 The Court acknowledged
the traditional deference given to the trial court when evaluating
"discriminatory intent" in peremptory challenges. 169 However, the
Court found evidence of racial discrimination in the dismissal of one
of the prospective black jurors, noting that two white jurors had
equally or more compelling hardship reasons to be struck from the
pool. 170 Because the trial court judge made no finding regarding the
prosecution's claim that the black juror in question "appeared
nervous," the Supreme Court ruled that it could not presume that the
161. Haas, supra note 156, at 387.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 388 ("The Roberts Court has loosened the standards for evaluating the competence of
capital defense attorneys, strengthened the hands of capital prosecutors, and upheld strict and
constitutionally vulnerable statutory and procedural roadblocks to the appellate review of capital
sentences.").
165. Id. at 436 (predicting that Allen Snyder's death sentence would be upheld by a 5-4 Supreme
Court decision).
166. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008).
167. Id. at 1207.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1205.
170. Id. at 1211-12.
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trial court accepted the prosecutor's proffered justifications for the
strike. 1
71
This decision was counter to at least one commentator's prediction
that Roberts and Alito would uphold Snyder's death sentence.
1 72
Alito's vote in particular was surprising, given that he was not
expected to share in his predecessor O'Connor's skepticism of lower
court rejections of claims of racial prejudice by capital defendants.173
Thirty-six years have passed since the Supreme Court insisted
upon safeguards in death penalty statutes to protect capital defendants
from "arbitrary and capricious" imposition of the death penalty.'
74
Fewer death sentences have been imposed in recent years, with only
forty-two death sentences imposed in 2007, the lowest number since
1994.175 This downward trend in death penalty sentencing
corresponds to declining public support for the death penalty. 176 The
legal careers of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have taken
place entirely in the post-Furman years. 177 Their votes in Snyder to
reverse a murder conviction due to possible prosecutorial racial
discrimination may indicate a changing perception of the role of race
in the justice system. 178 If even the most conservative Justices
recognize the reality of racial discrimination in criminal trials, the
Supreme Court may have reservations about allowing death sentences
to be imposed in situations where the jury may split along racial
lines, and thus decline to allow judges to impose death sentences
when the jury fails to come to a unanimous decision on a death
sentence. 1
7 9
Yet given the Court's holding in Harris that a judge alone may
impose the death penalty, even when the jury recommends a lesser
171. Id. at 1209.
172. Haas, supra note 156, at 437.
173. Id. at 436-37.
174. See discussion supra Part I.
175. Haas, supra note 156, at 428.
176. Id at 428.
177. Chief Justice Roberts graduated from law school in 1979. Justice Alito began his legal career in
1976. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
178. See discussion supra Part V.C.
179. See discussion supra Part HI.A.
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sentence, current precedent suggests that the Georgia proposal, if it
passes the Georgia General Assembly, will survive a Supreme Court
review.'8 ° The Court will likely find that the statute itself is a
sufficient means of expressing the "community's voice."
81
CONCLUSION
The proposed changes to allow a death sentence to be imposed by
a judge when a jury cannot come to a unanimous decision must pass
the constitutional requirements established by Supreme Court
precedent in order to achieve legal effect. 182 The Court has ruled that
unanimous jury verdicts are not required in the guilt phase of
criminal trials. 183 The Court has also held that judges alone may
impose death sentences, although juries alone are responsible for
findings of fact that can increase the potential sentencing of a
defendant. 184 This ruling extends to the determination of any
aggravating circumstances that would make a defendant eligible for a
capital sentence.
185
An increasing awareness of the role racial discrimination plays in
criminal trials may inform any Supreme Court ruling on the proposed
Georgia statute. 186 But unless or until Harris is reversed, a statute
allowing a judge to impose the death penalty even if the jury fails to
come to a unanimous death sentencing decision would appear to be
constitutional.
180. See discussion supra Parts II, V.B.
181. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,462 (1984).
182. See discussion supra Parts IV-VI.
183. See discussion supra Part IV.
184. See discussion supra Parts V-VI.
185. See discussion supra Part VI.
186. See discussion supra Part VlI.B.
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